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by Roly Evans
[ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ] 
In June and July 1945, two Royal Canadian Engineer officers, on their own initiative, carried out a review of the ongoing minefield clearance in Holland. The local military authori-ties deemed the review to be of significant value and there-
fore directed the Military Operational Research Unit to take up the 
study and “carry out a complete survey and analysis of all aspects 
of minefield clearance and casualties.”1 The study, entitled Military 
Operational Research Unit Report No.7 – Minefield Clearance and 
Casualties, Holland 1945, was initially intended to gather lessons 
about minefield clearance casualties in relation to combat. It became 
a significant study of demining during peace time. The resulting fifty-
seven page document remains one of the best analyses of minefield 
clearance, time, and resulting casualties ever conducted. Arguably, it 
has not been equaled or surpassed since. To this day, few in mine ac-
tion are even aware of it.
Mine Clearance in the Netherlands
As in other liberated European countries, wide-ranging mine 
clearance in the Netherlands started remarkably quickly after the ces-
sation of hostilities on 7 May 1945.2 Some limited clearance, mainly 
of routes, had taken place in southern Holland during the previous 
winter; however, concerted efforts only started when the occupy-
ing German 25th Army surrendered. By 20 May 1945, the Canadian 
and British military authorities, represented by the Allied 6th Army 
Headquarters, had overseen the formation of the German Draeger 
Brigade, named after its commander, Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant 
Colonel) Rudolf Draeger. The brigade’s 105 officers and 3,244 other 
ranks were formed from seven pioneer (engineer) battalions, a bat-
talion of fortress troops already stationed in Holland and some other 
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Image 1. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 – 
Minefield Clearance and Casualties front cover. 
Image courtesy of The National Archives.
Image 2. Oberstleutnant Rudolf Draeger briefs Captain Misseldine, 
Royal Engineers, on clearance in the Hook of Holland area, August 
1944. Draeger was widely deemed to have commanded the clear-
ance efforts in a highly competent manner, albeit his soldiers, cat-
egorized as Surrendered Enemy Personnel rather than prisoners 
of war, sustained casualties that would be unacceptable in mod-
ern mine action.
Image courtesy of Nationaal Archief.
Image 3. Draeger Brigade personnel count disarmed S-Mines be-
side a road in the Hook of Holland, August 1945. By this time, 
the clearance of mines from the Atlantic Wall minefields was 
nearing completion. Units of the Draeger Brigade had started to 
move south of the River Mass to clear minefields on the old win-
ter frontline between the Allies and the Germans. Accounting for 
11.8 percent of all mines found, 127,591 S-Mines were eventually 
removed by the Draeger Brigade in 1945. Relative to the number 
removed, the S-Mine was known to cause the highest fatality rate 
during accidents.
Image courtesy of Nationaal Archief.
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assorted units. Notably, given the subsequent casualties, a German 
military hospital and staff at Bloemendaal, west of Amsterdam, was 
included within the organization of the brigade from the beginning.3
The Draeger Brigade would be responsible for the vast majority of 
mine clearance in the Netherlands. Of the 1,377,898 mines cleared by 
23 November 1947, the Draeger Brigade had cleared 1,079,857 mines 
by as early as 31 December 1945.4 Some assistance was provided by 
the Netherland Mine Clearance and Bomb Disposal Company (BD) 
along with the 2nd Dogs Platoon, Royal Engineers (British Army). 
Dutch members of the Waffen SS imprisoned in a former concentra-
tion camp in Vught, near ‘s-Hertogenbosch, given the opportunity of 
better treatment if they participated, were also involved in clearance 
in the south of Holland.5 
The Draeger Brigade established its headquarters in Delft, be-
tween Rotterdam and The Hague. Work concentrated on the north-
ern half of the country until August 1945, with most effort focused 
on clearing the Atlantic Wall minefields on the coast. By October, all 
Draeger Brigade units had moved south of the river Maas to clear the 
minefields that resulted from the fighting between the Allies and the 
Germans. A replacement German military hospital at Sterksel, near 
Eindhoven, was placed under the Draeger Brigade’s responsibility at 
this time. On 1 October 1945, the Dutch Mijn Opruimings Dienst 
(Mine Clearance Service, MOD) took control of demining operations 
in Holland. Eventually approximately 1,800,000 landmines would be 
cleared in the Netherlands, some 422,102 cleared by the Dutch.6
The Pioneer Battalions worked extremely fast, especially when 
compared with modern day clearance efforts. In part they were en-
abled to do this by the generally excellent minefield records kept by 
the 25th Army. One example is Minefield 235 Goldfisch, (renamed 
Minefield 20 in Dutch records) in The Hague. The minefield of nine-
hundred 270 mm artillery projectiles (Geschossminen), adapted to 
be mines by fitting T.Mi.Z.29 pressure fuzes (which had anti-person-
nel and anti-tank weight settings), was laid by the Pioneer Battalion 
of the 719th Infantry Division in five days during 18–22 April 
1944. Covering an area of 87,688 sq m (104,874 sq yd) with a 194 m 
(212.2 yd) depth and 452 m (494.3 yd) frontage, it was cleared by a 
Image 4. Minenplan 235 Goldfisch, 2 May 1944, showing 900 Granatminen improvised from 270 mm artillery projectiles and T.Mi.Z.29 
pressure fuzes. Artillery projectiles fuzed in this way were common as early anti-tank mines during World War I. As with many Wehrmacht 
minefield records, to the quality and detail of this record enabled rapid clearance after the end of the conflict. The minefield of 87,688 
sq m (104,874 sq yd) was cleared in two days by a Fallschirmjäger pioneer platoon in late July 1944. 
Image courtesy of Defense Expertise Center, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, the Netherlands.
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Fallschirmjäger pioneer platoon in just two days, 26–27 July 1945.7 
Clearance of nearly 9 ha (22 ac) and nine-hundred mines in two days 
would rightly not be repeated in modern mine action, where such a 
task would take many months. Such speed underlines the urgency of 
the task and the risks that members of the Draeger Brigade were ex-
pected to undertake. The location of this minefield today now forms 
the playing fields of the International School in The Hague.
Collection and Quality Control of Data
One particular aspect of the demining operations in Holland was 
the great emphasis placed on recording and checking data. Both the 
official 6th Army Confidential Report and the Military Operational 
Research Unit Report No.7 detail at length the procedures followed. 
First, all minefield records were checked, assigned serial numbers, 
and drawn onto linen map traces by a Royal Engineers Intelligence 
Section attached to 66 Field Company Royal Engineers prior to clear-
ance.8 A color-coding system to denote German or Allied mine-
fields was adopted: green for Allied, blue for German. Copies of all 
maps were then bound in book form. An accompanying “Schedule 
of Minefields” was developed, recording all known details to comple-
ment the maps. Records were duplicated into a field copy and a mas-
ter copy. Minefield maps were issued to clearance teams from June 
1945 onwards. By 9 October 1945, 4,522 minefields had been regis-
tered in this way. Eventually 5,400 minefields and 900 areas contami-
nated with explosive remnants of war (ERW) would be registered in 
Holland by 1947.9 Ten book sets covered the whole of the Netherlands. 
Further to this overview, individual minefield maps and the 
remaining German records made up 
minefield files that were completed when 
the clearance certificate was added. All 
documents moved under careful control 
with the dispatch and receipt recorded 
in an index book. Importantly, field and 
master copies were carefully compared at 
the end of the process for discrepancies or 
irregularities as they were termed; essen-
tially a form of data quality control not 
always present in modern mine action.10 
For the period July–November 1945, time 
spent clearing in minefields was also 
carefully recorded in other forms with 
comparisons between units and sites 
made to check for irregularities.11 
6th Army HQ itself also recorded all 
casualty data using a simple standard-
ized pro-forma split into a section detail-
ing the circumstances of an accident and 
a section detailing injuries. Staff officers 
sought casualty data wherever it could be 
found, whether from unit medical offi-
cers, civilian doctors, or hospital records. 
Corroboration of forms was made by in-
terviewing witnesses and by examination 
of the returned forms against unit dai-
ly records.12 This careful and detailed approach to operational data, 
very briefly outlined here, while unglamorous, was essential to the 
subsequent operational analysis. 
Image 5. Mine Map Book record of minefields in the Hague. Minenplan 235 Goldfisch is numbered 
Minefield 20 and can be seen among the large rectangular minefields in the southwest corner of the 
image. The minefield site is now the playing fields of the International School of The Hague.
Image courtesy of Defense Expertise Center, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, the Netherlands.
Image 6. By 1947, 5,400 minefields and 900 areas were registered 
by the authorities in Holland. The red dots in this image indicate 
where minefields were found. Broadly the minefields can be di-
vided into two categories; those on the coast forming part of the 
Atlantic Wall, and those in the areas of the September 1944 until 
May 1945 front lines. The latter tend to be near the Rivers Maas 
and Waal, from eastern Holland to the coast.
Image courtesy of Defense Expertise Center, Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal, the Netherlands.
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Time Study
No study in mine action has ever recorded the man hours expend-
ed versus the mines removed on the scale of Military Operational 
Research Unit Report No.7. Trials were conducted of manual mine 
clearance methods in Moamba, Mozambique, from October to 
November 2004, and while the record of this is more detailed in some 
respects, it was a severely limited trial, not an analysis of a work sam-
ple as large as in Holland in 1945. 
The study of “time and labor factors” in 1945 allowed an analysis 
for each battalion of the man hours expended per 100 mines lifted. 
This ranged from 57 to 78 hours—a difference of up to 27 percent 
between units, usually explained by the different concentration of 
mines between minefields rather than differences in operational effi-
ciency. The more concentrated minefields required fewer man hours 
to remove an equivalent number of mines.13
The time spent removing different mine types was also calculat-
ed. Metal anti-tank Tellerminen required on average 56 man hours 
to remove 100 mines. Wooden, anti-personnel Schuminen, almost 
Image 7. 6th Army HQ Minefield Map trace between the villages of Dreumel and Wamel on the Waal river, west of Nijmegen. German 
minefields are represented in blue, Allied minefields in green. As minefields were cleared, the polygons would be colored in. A field 
and HQ copy of this and associated documents existed, one being used to check the other for discrepancies. This was a small part of 
what was in effect a larger data quality management system that enabled the subsequent operational research contained in Military 
Operational Research Unit Report No.7. (The information on this map does not relate to any current clearance of minefields in this 
area). The National Archives (TNA) PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clear-
ance and casualties. p.42.
Image 8. This table and similar ones in the Report No.7 (Table 
5, p.17) underline the benefits of accurate reporting supported 
by appropriate data quality control systems. Those overseeing 
clearance in the Netherlands in the post-war years often had 
much better information about what was found and in what con-
dition than we do in many cases today. Which national author-
ity or even clearance organization could produce such statistics 
now? WO 205/1186: Confidential Report on Mine Clearance in the 
Netherlands. Appendix F.
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Image 9. Draeger Brigade personnel count disarmed Tellermine-43s beside a road in the 
Hook of Holland, August 1945. 200,456 Tellermines of all types were eventually removed 
by the Draeger Brigade in 1945, a total representing 18.6 percent of all mines found. 
The Tellermine-43 would be copied by the Yugoslav Army as the TMM-1 and would later 
be found during the 1990s conflicts in the Balkans.
Image courtesy of Nationaal Archief.
Image 10. 6th Army HQ were able to use the casualty and mines found returns to plot the respective figures in two comparative 
graphs. The graph underlines the significant casualties sustained by each sub unit of the Draeger Brigade and how casualties were 
broadly proportional to the number of mines removed, albeit with the notable exception of the 346th Pioneer Battalion, which lifted 
approximately 55,000 mines but had the highest casualty figures, greater than units that lifted up to four times more mines. The 
346th Pioneer Battalion was employed for a considerable time in the area of Arnhem clearing “unrecorded or scattered” Schumine 
minefields. WO 205/1186: Confidential Report on Mine Clearance in the Netherlands. Appendix I.
impossible to find with the detectors of 
the day, required on average 70 hours. The 
Riegelminen 43, required on average 97 man 
hours to remove 100 mines, most likely be-
cause deminers were extremely wary since 
wiring within the fuze mechanism could 
function easily on handling due to the effects 
of corrosion. In Holland in 1945, the Draeger 
Brigade removed, on average, a Tellerminen 
every 34 working minutes, and a Schuminen 
every 42 working minutes. The fastest time 
recorded in a given week for a minimum 
sample of 1,000 mines was 15 working min-
utes for a Tellerminen and 20 minutes for a 
Schuminen.14 Whether using the averages or 
the fastest times recorded, this speed of dem-
ining is well outside of modern norms, even 
in circumstances such as the dense minefield 
patterns in Sri Lanka.
Analysis of Mines Found
The Draeger Brigade’s conscientious re-
porting also allowed a good overview of ex-
plosive devices found. For example, careful 
records were kept of what mines were booby-
trapped, what mines were assessed as being 
in a condition that made them unable to det-
onate and which mines had been damaged by 
the weather or corrosion. Less than 1 percent 
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of the main anti-tank mines, Tellerminen and Holzminen, were booby-trapped, 2.33 percent of 
S-Minen, and 2.97 percent of Riegelminen. This was less than the military authorities were ex-
pecting, having become used to German booby-trapping during the later years of the conflict. 
Seven decades before the current studies of landmine aging, a relatively detailed analysis was 
made in Holland in 1945. Ground conditions were characterized into three categories: sandy/
Image 11. A Dutch sailor guards two members of the Kriegsmarine as they remove Tellerminen-
42s from an Atlantic Wall beach minefield. Dependent on which time period is used, between 
0.87 and 1.7 percent Tellerminen were recorded as booby-trapped with anti-lift devices in 
Holland. The image underlines the lack of basic safety precautions taken by most units at 
the time, be it PPE or working/safety distances. Units that reduced the number of individu-
als working in close proximity tended to have lower casualty rates.
Image courtesy of Beeldbank WO2 – NIOD.
Image 12. No.2 Dogs Platoon checking the railway line between Eindhoven and Venlo, 25 
November 1944. The report surmised the belief that dogs were “not 100% effective” and that 
it was decided to use them to search long stretches of railway line and under high tension 
cables. Dogs were not used as a search asset in areas known to be mined.
Image courtesy of the Imperial War Museum.
dry earth, low-lying meadows, and polder-
land flooded since the mines were laid. The 
respective aging characteristics of casings, ig-
niters, or fuzes and detonators for metal and 
wooden mines were noted in each of these 
conditions. The report found that wooden 
mines were unsurprisingly the most vulner-
able to weathering, with 20 percent deemed 
damaged. Anti-handling devices, especial-
ly cocked striker pull fuzes, were particu-
larly prone due to “damp penetrating the 
firing cap and rusting the spring.” Indeed, 
aside from what casing was used for the mine 
(metal being more resilient than wood), the 
chief cause of probable failure of a device was 
“the high percentage of ineffective igniters.”15 
This is consistent with recent studies of mine 
functionality in the Falkland Islands, where 
of a sample of 100 P4B mine fuzes, only one 
was found to be functional.16
Analysis of Accidents 
and Casualties
The Draeger Brigade sustained 563 casu-
alties from 290 accidents in 1945, an aver-
age casualty rate of 17.5 percent of its final 
strength. There were 165 fatalities, 29 per-
cent of all casualties. Casualty rates for its 
sub-units ranged from 6.1 to 29.6 percent.17 
The landmines or other explosive hazards 
involved in accidents were strictly recorded 
allowing an analysis of the respective risk of 
different mine types. Of the 563 casualties 
from 290 accidents, 391 casualties came from 
201 anti-personnel mine accidents, 69 per-
cent of each respective total. In terms of acci-
dents proportional to mines lifted, bounding 
fragmentation S-Mines proved to have the 
highest fatality rate amongst anti-personnel 
mines. This corresponded to anecdotal ex-
perience of combat where soldiers routinely 
feared the S-Mine for the number of casual-
ties it could cause over a relatively wide area. 
Even today bounding fragmentation mines 
tend to require enhanced safety distances 
during clearance operations. While there 
were significantly fewer anti-tank mine ac-
cidents (31 percent), when they did happen 
fatality rates were high as would be expect-
ed given the higher net explosive quantities 
involved.18 The mean number of casualties 
per accident ranged between 1.62 for the 
Schuminen to 2.32 for the S-mine, with an 
average for all types being 1.94.19 Safety or 
working distances were not introduced dur-
ing these clearance operations, and it is dif-
ficult to understand why such a simple safety 
measure was not employed.
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Units were given a high degree of discretion in how they went 
about clearing the minefields and considerable differences in proce-
dure existed amongst them. The Battalion GROH, made up of former 
“fortress troops” manning the Atlantic Wall, stated that there were 
“never more than four men in any one mine-lifting party.” Whereas 
in Battalion 526, twenty men could be “prodding and lifting in the 
same row of mines.” The average size of mine clearance party working 
in close proximity to each other in the Draeger Brigade was seven oth-
er ranks and one NCO.20 Battalion 526 had the third highest casualty 
rate, Battalion GROH the lowest.21 Procedure was not the only expla-
nation for casualty rates however, as the graph reproduced at Image 
10 makes clear. In general the more mines a unit cleared the more ca-
sualties they had. As in modern mine action, explanations for given 
indicators could often be multi-faceted.
Schuminen were the most common mine of any type found in the 
Netherlands, with 229,431 cleared in 1945 alone.22 Despite some met-
al content, the mine was very difficult to find using the detectors of 
the day and effectively posed the same hazard to deminers as more 
modern minimal metal mines. Schuminen were normally detect-
ed using a standing prodding drill. This proved to be inappropriate 
and dangerous. Resulting injuries to the face and eyes from primary 
and secondary fragmentation were common, with rudimentary eye 
protection proving only partially effective. This prodding drill often 
missed Schuminen with casualties caused by stepping on them usu-
ally resulting in an amputation of the leg.
What was also significant about the Military Operational Research 
Unit Report No. 7 was how casualty data could be analyzed in contect 
of the good quality operational reporting overall. For example, the 
study could calculate the number of mines lifted for each accident and 
for each casualty by battalion. The figures for the eight units ranged 
between the 20th Pioneer Battalion, who lifted 5,500 mines per ac-
cident and 2,720 mines per casualty (40 accidents), and the 346th 
Pioneer Battalion who lifted 1,240 mines per accident and 580 mines 
per casualty (49 accidents). For all the eight battalions there was a 
rank correlation of 0.71 between the number of mines lifted per ac-
cident and the number of casualties per accident.23 This could be ex-
plained by the differing working procedures in the field between units. 
However, there were other explanations. The 20th Pioneer Battalion 
tended to clear well-marked and recorded Atlantic Wall minefields; 
the 346th Pioneer Battalion was employed for a considerable time in 
the area of Arnhem clearing “unrecorded or scattered” Schuminen 
minefields. It is believed context such as this was important in under-
standing the difference in performance. As with all performance in-
dicators, the key was to use the evidence as the starting point to seek 
further explanation. In short, the statistics allowed those in charge to 
ask the right questions. The same principle applies when using statis-
tics and key performance indicators in mine action today.
The study also contained recommendations concerning the use of 
dogs in demining operations that resonate with experience in modern 
mine action. The requirements for practice on dummy minefield and 
the need for rest days in order to maintain the “interest of both dogs 
and men” were deemed essential. Handlers needed to demonstrate 
“care and patience.” While dogs had uses, they were deemed “not 
100% effective.” It was decided that the dogs were not reliable enough 
to be used on known minefields but were better suited to “routine 
checking of suspect areas and the proving of and delimiting of areas 
in which mines were rumored to exist.” 155 miles of railway line, 73 
miles under high tension cables, and 77,000 sq yd (64,382 sq m) were 
searched by “war dogs” with 29 mines being found in this way. Dogs 
were “fully justified on large areas of non-metallic anti-personnel 
mines.”24 Much of this experience is reflected in the modern Animal 
Detection Systems IMAS, where it is recognized that a concentration 
of explosive targets can confuse dogs, and the need for strict accredi-
tation of both handler and mine detection dog is mandated.25
Conclusion
This brief summary of the Military Operational Research Unit 
Report No.7 has given only a limited overview. The detail the report 
was able to marshal is only partially reflected.
A number of German personnel continued clearance in Holland 
for another two years. The last 19 German Surrendered Enemy 
Personnel were sent back to the British Army of the Rhine for demo-
bilization on the 3rd of October 1947. The final total of German casu-
alties for both mine and ERW clearance in the Netherlands was 650. 
Of these 225 (34 percent) were fatal casualties. Eighty-three Dutch 
clearance personnel were also killed during the clearance effort of 
their country.26
Much was done poorly during the clearance efforts in Holland in 
1945. Casualties were very high, unacceptably high by modern stan-
dards, and the treatment of German Surrendered Enemy Personnel 
remains contentious to this day. Clearance techniques were often ru-
dimentary and safety precautions were often casual. Modern mine 
action has in many ways improved significantly on the technical de-
mining ability of those who went before us in the post-war years, with 
better on-site procedures and personal protective equipment.
However, the limitations of the 1945 efforts should be seen in the 
context of what was done well, and even what was done better. The 
military authorities in Holland were ahead of their time in terms of 
analyzing their own operations, be it in relation to the use of mine de-
tection dogs, aging of landmines, time studies, recording of devices 
found or the recording of casualties. Data collection and analysis was 
in many ways superior in 1945 than during much of modern mine ac-
tion. Quality management of data in particular is an aspect where ar-
guably we have still not caught up. We can do better. We owe it as a 
sector to the deminers risking their lives daily in the field to do so. 
See endnotes page 71
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